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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of the ad-valorem commodity tax as a policy device on the
location decision of undifferentiated oligopolistic firms with free entry. It shows that: (1)
When the distance between the plant location and the output market is held constant, the
optimum location for the oligopolistic firm would be independent of the ad-valorem tax if the
production function is homothetic, and (2) when the distance between the plant location and
the output market is a decision variable, the optimum location for the oligopolistic firm will
move closer to the output market if the demand function is linear or concave. These results
are significantly different from the conventional results based on the monopolistic location
model. It indicates that the effect of an ad-valorem tax on the location decision of
oligopolistic firms crucially depend upon the shape of market demand function.
Keywords: ad-valorem commodity tax, undifferentiated oligopoly, location decision,
Weber-Moses triangle
JEL Classification Codes: H25, L13, R38

1. Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Moses (1958), a large number of studies have attempted to
integrate location theory with neoclassical production theory. Most of location literature
examines the impact of the characteristics of production function on the plant location
decision (see Martinich and Hurter, 1990). One of important assumptions is that business
taxes are insignificant and negligible. However, it is well-known that local government often
uses different types of taxes to persuade certain kinds of industry to locate in its region or to
dissuade other forms of industry from locating there. This indicates that business taxes have a
significant impact on the firm’s location decision. In an interesting and important paper,
Hwang and Mai (henceforth HM) (1987) incorporated the ad-valorem commodity tax into the
linear location model and examined the impact of an ad-valorem tax on the plant location
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decision. Chan and Shieh (henceforth CS) (1997) extended Hwang and Mai’s analysis to the
two-dimensional Weber-Moses triangular location model. Assuming that (1) a monopolist
uses two transportable inputs located at two vertices to produce a product which is sold at
CBD (i.e., Central Business District) located at the third vertex and (2) the objective of the
firm is to find the profit maximizing plant location within the triangle, they obtained the
following interesting propositions.
CS1. When the distance of plant location from CBD is held constant, the optimum location is
independent of the change of an ad-valorem tax if and only if the production function is
homothetic. Chan and Shieh (1997, p. 541).
CS2. When the distance of plant location from CBD is a decision variable, the optimum
location is independent of the change of an ad-valorem tax if and only if the production
function exhibits constant returns to scale. It moves toward CBD as the ad-valorem tax
increases if and only if the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale, and
away from CBD if and only if the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale.
Chan and Shieh (1997, p. 543).
These results are based on the polar case of monopoly. They show that the impact of an advalorem tax on the location decision of a firm crucially depends upon the economic scale of
production function and the demand factors of location are not significant. Given that
oligopolistic industries are relatively common in the economy, it is surprising that the impact
of an ad-valorem tax in the oligopolistic location model has received little attention.
The purpose of this paper is to explicitly incorporate the ad-valorem taxes into Mai and
Hwang (1992) two-dimensional oligopoly triangular location model and examine the impact
of a change in the ad-valorem tax on the plant location of undifferentiated oligopolistic firms.1
This Weber-Moses triangular location model has been widely used in location theory, as
Hurter and Martinich pointed out (1989), because of greater tractability. In a recent paper,
Chen and Shieh (2011) introduced the specific commodity tax into Mai and Hwang (1992)
model. They showed that when plant location is a decision variable the effects of a change in
the specific tax on output per firm, the number of firms and total output will be different from
the well-known Besley (1989) results in non-spatial setting. However, they did not consider
the case of an ad-valorem tax. In this paper, we will show that the impact of an ad-valorem
tax on the location decision of undifferentiated oligopolistic firms crucially depends upon the
shape of inverse demand curve, and CS1holds but CS2 may not hold in the oligopolistic
location model.

2. An oligopolistic location model
Following Mai and Hwang (1992), our analysis is based on the following assumptions.
(a) N firms employ two transportable inputs (m1 and m2) located at A and B to produce a
homogenous product (q) which is sold at the output market C locating at the CBD.
The location triangle in Figure 1 illustrates the location problem of oligopolistic firms.
In figure 1, the distance a and b and the angle γ are known; h is the distance between
the plant location (E) and the CBD (C); z1 and z2 are the distances of plant location (E)
from A and B, respectively; θ is the angle between CA and CE.
1

Mai and Hwang model (1992) has served as a basis for a recent attempt to integrate location issues with trade
policy, external economies of scale, oligopsony power in the input markets and specific commodity taxes, see
Hwang and Mai (1999), Mai and Hwang (1997), Hwang and Shieh (2007), and Chen and Shieh (2011).
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Figure 1. The Weber-Moses Triangle
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(b) Firms make Cournot-Nash conjectures about their rivals’ production and location
decisions and enter the industry without any restrictions until there is no economic
profit. Assume also that equilibra are symmetric. Thus, we can neglect the location
dispersion of firms and focus on the impact of market demand on the location decision
of a representative firm.
(c) The production function is homothetic and can be specified as:
q = f (m1, m2)

(1)

with fm1 ≡ ∂q/∂m1 > 0, fm2 ≡ ∂q/∂m2 > 0, fm1m1 ≡ ∂2q/∂m12 < 0, and fm2m2 ≡ ∂2q/∂m22 < 0.
(d) The industry inverse demand function for output is given by
P = P(Q)

(2)

where Q = ∑qi is the market quantity demanded, PQ ≡ ∂P/∂Q < 0, cf. Mai and Hwang
(1992, p. 256).
N

It should be noted that ∑ denotes ∑.
i=1

(e) The prices of inputs and output are evaluated at the plant location (E). The cost of
purchasing inputs is the price of input at the source plus the freight cost, and the price
of output is the market price minus the freight cost.
(f) Transportation rates per unit of output or inputs and per unit of distance are constant.
(g) The government imposes an ad-valorem commodity tax which can be specified as:
T = tPq

(3)

where t = the ad-valorem tax rate, 1 > t > 0.2

2

It should be noted that in the specific tax case T = tq where t = the specific tax rate.
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(h) The objective of each firm is to find the optimum location and production within the
Weber triangle which maximizes the profit.
It is of interest to note that the inclusion of an ad-valorem commodity tax constitutes the
only point of departure from the Mai and Hwang model.
With these assumptions, the profit maximizing location problem of the representative firm
is given by:
max Π = [P(Q)-rh] f (m1, m2) – (w1+r1z1)m1 – (w2+r2z2)m2 – tP(Q)f(m1, m2)

(4)

where z1 = (a2 + h2 – 2ahcosθ)1/2, z2 = [b2 + h2 – 2bhcos(γ-θ)]1/2; w1 and w2 are the base prices
of m1 and m2 at their sources A and B; r, r1 and r2 are constant transportation rates of q, m1,
m2; z1, z2, and h are the distances from the plant location to the source location A, B and the
market location C. It is worth mentioning that q, m1, m2, h and θ are choice variables and a, b,
t, γ, w1, w2, r, r1, r2 are positive parameters.
Assuming that the oligopolistic firm treats q instead of m1 and m2 as a decision variable,
we first derive the production cost function which does not include the transport cost of
output. The production cost minimization subject to a given output at a given location can be
specified as:
min L = (w1+r1z1)m1 + (w2+r2z2)m2 + λ[q – f (m1, m2)]

(5)

where λ is the Lagrange multiplier; q, h and θ are parameters. Utilizing the standard
comparative static analysis and the envelope theorem, we can show that the production
function is homothetic if and only if the cost function is separable in the sense that:
C(q; h, θ) = c (w1+r1z1, w2+r2z2) H(q)

(6)

where c is a function of the delivered prices of m1 and m2, H is a function of output. For a
detailed discussion of this, see Takayama (1993, Proposition 3.5., pp. 147-148) and Silberberg
(1978, Chapter 10, pp. 300-309). Hence, the average production cost and marginal cost can
be written as:
AC = C(q; h, θ)/q = c(.)H(q)/q
MC = Cq = c(.)Hq

(7)
(8)

where Cq ≡ ∂(q; h, θ)/∂q and Hq ≡ dH(q)/dq.
Following Hanoch (1975), from (7) and (8), we obtain the following relation:
H(q)/q > (=) < Hq

(9)

if the production function exhibits increasing (constant) or decreasing returns to scale.
Substituting the production cost function C = C(q; h, θ) into (4), we obtain the profit as a
function of q, θ and h. The first-order condition for a maximum would be:
∂Π/∂q = (1 – t)(P + PQq) – rh – c(.)Hq = 0
∂Π/∂θ = - cθH(q) = 0
∂Π/∂h = - rq – chH(q) = 0

(10)
(11)
(12)

where cθ ≡ ∂c(.)/∂θ, ch ≡ ∂c(.)/∂h. Assume that the second-order conditions are satisfied and
the possibility of the corner solution is excluded; cf. Kusumoto (1986) and Mai and Hwang
(1992). We can solve (10)-(12) for q, θ and h when entry is prohibited.
If free entry is allowed, each firm in the industry earns only normal profit. The following
condition must be satisfied.
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Π = [P(Nq) – rh]q – c(.)H(q) – tP(Nq)q = 0

(13)

If there is an interior solution, we can solve equations (10) – (13) for q, θ, h and N in terms
of t and v = (a, b, γ, w1, w2, r1, r2, r), where v is a vector of remaining parameters.
q = q(t, v),

θ = θ(t, v),

h = h(t, v),

N = N(t, v)

(14)

The expressions for the partial derivatives such as ∂q/∂t, ∂θ/∂t, ∂h/∂t and ∂N/∂t can be
obtained by applying the standard comparative static analyses. It is worth mentioning before
concluding this section that the production function must exhibit increasing returns to scale
for the first-order conditions to have a solution as in (14). To see this, we divide both sides of
equation (13) by q and obtain:
(1 – t)P(Nq) – rh = [c(.)H(q)/q]

(15)

Substituting (15) into (10), we obtain:
(1 – t)PQq = c(.)[Hq(q) - H(q)/q]

(16)

Since the left-hand side of (16) is negative, for the right-hand side of (16) to be negative,
[Hq(q) - H(q)/q] < 0, i.e., the production function must exhibit increasing returns to scale. This
indicates that H(q)/q > Hq(q), cf. Hwang, Mai and Shieh (2007). It simply implies that in
equilibrium all firms produce on the downward sloping part of the average cost curve and do
not minimize average cost under Cournot competition with free entry.
This completes our modeling of the basic framework for studying the effect of an advalorem tax on the oligopolistic firm’s location decision.

3. Effects of ad-valorem taxes on location decision
We are now in a position to examine the effect of a change in the ad-valorem tax rate on the
optimum location. Following CS (1997), we consider two cases: (1) h is given and θ is the
decision variable; (2) both h and θ are decision variables.
3.1. h is given
In this case, the firm will locate its plant along arc IJ and equation (12) can be dropped from
the first-order conditions. Totally differentiating equations (10), (11) and (13) and applying
Cramer’s rule, we obtain the following results:
(∂θ/∂t)h = 0
(∂q/∂t)h = (1/J’)(1 – t)Πθθq3(PQ2 – PPQQ)
J’ = (ΠqqΠN – ΠqΠqN)Πθθ = (1 – t)2Πθθq2PQ((PQ + qPQQ) + {PQ – [1/(1 – t)]c(.)Hqq})

(17)
(18)
(19)

where Πθθ < 0 and J’ < 0 by the stability condition. Or assume that (PQ + qPQQ) < 0 and PQ –
[1/(1 – t)]c(.)Hqq < 0, (Seade 1980, p. 483) and Πθθ < 0 (SOSC).3
From equation (17), we can conclude that:
Proposition 1. If h is constant and greater than zero and θ is a decision variable, the
optimum location is independent of the change in an ad-valorem tax if and only if the
production function is homothetic.

3

The detailed derivations of the mathematical argument in this paper are available on request from the author.
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In other words, if the expansion path in the input space is linear through the origin, a
change in the ad-valorem tax will change m1 and m2 by the same proportionate amount. Two
material pulls compensate each other; hence the plant location is invariant with respect to a
change in the ad-valorem tax. This result is consistent with CS1. However, our result
generalizes CS1 since we show that CS1 can be applied to undifferentiated oligopolistic firms
with free entry.
From equation (18), we can see that if the market demand function is linear or concave,
i.e., PQQ ≤ 0, (∂q/∂t)h > 0.4 In other words, an increase in the ad-valorem tax will increase
output per firm. This result is similar to that in the traditional non-spatial setting, cf. Tanaka
(1993, p. 45). However, this result is different from that in the monopolistic location model. It
can be shown that an increase in the ad-valorem tax always decreases output of monopolistic
firm.
3.2. h and θ are variables
In this case, both h and θ are decision variables. Totally differentiating equations (10) - (13)
and applying Cramer’s rule, we obtain the following results.
(∂θ/∂t) = (1/D4)(1 - t)Πθhq3(PQ2 – PPQQ)ch{[H(q)/q] – Hq}
(∂h/∂t) = (-1/D4)(1 – t)Πθθq3(PQ2 – PPQQ)ch{[H(q)/q] – Hq}
(∂q/∂t) = (D2/D4)(1 – t)q3(PQ2 - PPQQ)

(20)
(21)
(22)

where Πθh = - chθH(q), Πθθ = - cθθH(q), Πqq = (N + 1)PQ + NPQQq – cHqq, Πq = PQq(N – 1), Πqh
= ch{[H(q)/q] – Hqq}, D2 = ΠθθΠhh - Πθh2 and D4 is the relevant Hessian determinant. It should
be noted that Πθθ < 0, D2 > 0 and D4 > 0 by the stability conditions, ch < 0 can be seen from
equation (12) and [H(q)/q] – Hq > 0 is due to increasing returns to scale.
It is clear that the signs of (∂θ/∂t), (∂h/∂t) and (∂q/∂t) depend upon the shape of market
demand function, i.e., (PQ2 - PPQQ). From (20) – (22), we can see that if the market demand
function is linear or concave, i.e., PQQ ≤ 0, (∂q/∂t) > 0, (∂h/∂t) < 0.5 Thus, we can conclude
that:
Proposition 2. An increase in the ad-valorem tax will increase output per firm and move
plant location closer to the CBD if the demand function is linear or concave.
The effect of an ad-valorem tax on the optimum output and location is, perhaps, surprising.
According to Hwang and Mai (1987) and Chan and Shieh (1997), in the monopoly case with
increasing returns to scale, an increase in the ad-valorem tax will decrease the monopolist’s
output level and induce the firm to move its plant location farther away from CBD. But the
above result shows that HM’s and CS’s monopolistic results can not apply to the oligopoly
case. The economic interpretation behind Proposition 2 is given as follows. An increase in the
ad-valorem tax rate does not change the slope of the demand curve at any output level but will
increase the output price in equilibrium for the firm to break even. In the case where the
demand function is linear or concave (i.e., PQQ ≤ 0), a higher output price decreases the
absolute value of the slope of the demand curve and so the point of tangency between demand
curve and average curve occurs at a larger output level for each firm. Since the production
function exhibits increasing returns to scale, the quantity of inputs, m1 and m2, per unit of

4

It should be noted that in the case of the specific tax (∂q/∂t)h > 0 if PQQ < 0, i.e., the market demand function
must be concave. See Chen and Shieh (2011, p. 30).
5
In the case of the specific tax, it can be shown that (∂q/∂t) > 0, (∂h/∂t) < 0 if PQQ < 0. If the market demand
function is linear, PQQ = 0, then (∂q/∂t) = 0, (∂h/∂t) = 0. For details, see Chen and Shieh (2011, pp. 32-33).
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output declines, then the resources pull decreases while the market pull increases. As a result,
the optimum location moves towards the CBD.

5. Concluding remarks
We have presented a simple oligopolistic location model and examined the impact of an advalorem tax on the production and plant location decisions of undifferentiated oligopolistic
firms. We show the impact of an ad-valorem tax on the optimum production and plant
location of an oligopolistic firm depends upon the shape of demand function. These results
are different from HM’s and CS’s results based on the monopolistic location model. HM
(1987) and CS (1997) show that the impact of an ad-valorem tax on the location decision of a
monopolistic firm depends on the characteristics of production function only and the demand
function plays no role.
In the case where the distance between the plant location and the output market is given,
we show that the optimum location of undifferentiated oligopolistic firms is independent of
the ad-valorem tax if the production function is homothetic.
In the case where the distance between the plant location and the output market is a
decision variable, we show that an increase in the ad-valorem tax will cause each firm’s
output to rise and move the plant location closer to the output market if the demand function
is linear or concave.
Although our analysis is based on a simplified oligopolistic location model, it has shed
some light on the output and location effects of the ad-valorem tax in an oligopolistic location
setting. It shows that the market demand condition plays an important influence on the effects
of an ad-valorem tax on output and location decisions. Our results are significantly different
from the conventional results based on the monopoly setting. This indicates that indirect taxes
policies which aim at persuading and dissuading certain kinds of industry to locate or from
locating in its region should receive carefully scrutiny, and there is a need for future research
in this area.
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